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International migration affects equilibrium unemployment in a small open economy
characterised by efficiency wages. Immigration into employment reduces unemployment
rates, and immigration into unemployment increases them. The effect of emigration depends
on its impact on the aggregate job turnover rate.
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Immigration is a considerable political issue in most advanced countries, at least in part 
because of its labour market effects.  For example, the enlargement of the European 
Union has created anxiety about the effects on local employment of migration from 
poorer to richer states, many of which have chosen to retain controls on such migration 
for a while.  Moreover it seems quite likely that labour markets will become increasingly 
internationalised in the future, particularly in the case of skilled labour, which implies 
that we can expect to see larger two-way labour flows between countries at similar levels 
of development. Although the literature on globalisation has addressed the labour market 
implications of increased international competition in product markets in some depth 
(Andersen, 2005; Feenstra and Hanson, 2001), the effect of labour migration in aggregate 
models of unemployment seems to be a neglected issue.  Empirical work has tended to 
focus on the local labour market effects of migration (Lalonde and Topel, 1997). 
 
This paper considers the impact of international labour migration in the efficiency wage 
model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  This model is a convenient vehicle for considering 
the effects of migration on aggregate unemployment.  The economy is assumed to be 
small relative to the rest of the world.  In the model, higher wages are paid to elicit extra 
effort from workers, if that is more profitable than paying low wages for low effort. The 
threat of dismissal if low effort is detected is only effective if unemployment is 
significant, so the high-wage equilibrium is associated with unemployment.  The 
equilibrium depends on the exogenous parameters of the model: the disutility of effort, 
the level of unemployment benefits, the frequency of job separations, the discount rate 
and the probability of detection of low effort.  In what follows we assume that the 
economy is always in the high-wage/high-effort equilibrium. 
 
In this paper international migration is added to the model.  For simplicity migration 
propensities are treated as exogenous; otherwise the model becomes very complex.  Both 
employed and unemployed workers have some probability of emigration, and immigrants 
may enter employment or unemployment.  The lifetime utility of someone who moves 
abroad is assumed exogenous and independent of their employment status.  
 
2.  The model 
 
We consider a small open economy, which cannot influence the outside world to any 
significant extent, and which therefore takes external variables as exogenous.  At date t 
the economy has a labour force of Mt, a stock of Ut unemployed individuals and a stock 
of Lt employed individuals. In what follows these tend to appear as the unemployment 
rate ut = Ut/Mt and the employment rate 1–ut = Lt/Mt.  
 
There is a fixed component to the job separation rate (c) that results in a flow into 
unemployment.  In addition a proportion f of employed workers choose to emigrate in 
each period, as do a proportion h of unemployed workers.  These probabilities 
presumably depend on the attractions of emigration, but we do not model this explicitly.  
Thus (c + f)Lt job vacancies are created in each period  (the possibility that c is negatively   1
related to f is considered later).   These job vacancies are filled either by the unemployed 
or by immigrants. We assume that immigration into employment and unemployment 
represents proportions g and k of the existing labour force respectively.  Thus total 
immigration is equal to (g + k)Mt, and total emigration is equal to [f(1–ut) + hut]Mt. 
 
Apart from migration, the model is as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Those in 
employment have to choose between low effort (shirking) and high effort (not shirking).  
If discovered, which happens with probability p, shirking results in dismissal and a spell 
of unemployment.  The disutility of high effort is e, and of low effort is zero.  All 
workers receive the same wage (w).  There is no natural population growth.  In the steady 
state, net migration can occur provided that it leaves the unemployment rate unchanged.  
The steady-state condition is then that the stock of unemployed has to fall at a rate equal 
to the unemployment rate times the rate of net emigration. 
 




N = w – e + [1/(1 + r)][(1 – c – f)V
N + cV
U + fV*]        (1) 
 
where V
U is the expected lifetime utility of an unemployed person and V* that of an 
emigrant.  The equivalent equation for a shirker is: 
 
  V
S = w + [1/(1 + r)][(1 – c – f – p)V
S + (c + p)V
U + fV*]        (2) 
 
In order to induce high effort, V
N ≥ V
S.  The supply curve of high effort is where this is an 
equality, which from (1) and (2) gives: 
 
 (1  + r)(w – e) = (1 + r)(r + c + f)(e/p) + (r + f)V
U – fV*         (3) 
 
The lifetime expected utility of an unemployed person, on the assumption that when 
employed the individual is a non-shirker, is: 
 
  V
U = b + [1/(1 + r)][(1 – a – h)V
U + aV
N + hV*]                 (4) 
 
where b represents unemployment benefits and a is the probability of moving into 




–1{(r + c + f)b + a(w – e) + [af + h(r + c + f)](1 + r)V*} 
 
       J = (1 + r)[(r + c + f)(r + h) + a(r + f)]   (5) 
 
Substitution of (5) into the non-shirking condition (3) gives, after manipulation: 
 
  w = e + Zb + (r + c + f + aZ)(e/p) – (Z – 1)[r/(1 + r)]V* 
 
 Z = (r + f)/(r + h)        (6) 
   2
The steady-state condition requires that net emigration (n) leaves the unemployment rate 
unchanged.  This means that the rate of decline in unemployment (the outflow rate minus 
the inflow rate) is equal to the unemployment rate times net emigration, or in other 
words: 
 
 ( a + h)u – k – c(1 – u) = u[f(1 – u) + hu – g – k]     (7) 
 
Using (7) to substitute for a in (6) yields the supply curve of high effort: 
 
  w = e + b + {r + c + f + [(1 – u)(f – h + k/u + c/u) – g]Z}(e/p)  
     + (1 – Z){[r/(1 + r)]V* – b}          (8) 
 
Any increase in the right-hand side of (8) for a given value of u shifts the supply curve of 
high effort upwards.  With a downward-sloping demand curve for labour, both wages and 
unemployment would then increase.  In other words, sign(∂u/∂x) = sign(∂w/∂x|u) in 
equation (8).  Since (1+r)b/r is the lifetime utility of someone who is permanently 





It is convenient to consider first the special case where the employed and the unemployed 
have equal probabilities of emigrating (f = h).  Note that this implies that Z = 1.  Equation 
(8) then simplifies to: 
 
  w = e + b + (r + n + k/u + c/u)(e/p)        ( 9 )  
 
where n = f – g – k is net emigration.  This only reduces to the closed-economy solution 
of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) if there is no net migration (n = 0) and if all immigrants 
enter employment directly (k = 0).  To the extent that immigrants are unemployed (k > 0), 
they leave more vacancies open to the local unemployed, thus shortening unemployment 
spells and reducing the punishment for shirking.  Hence unemployment is increasing in k.  
Net emigration works in a similar way.  With positive net emigration, more job vacancies 
and more direct emigration opportunities are created for the domestic unemployed, 
relative to the competition for jobs from immigrants.  Thus net emigration also increases 
the unemployment rate. 
 
In the general case where f ≠ h, equation (8) shows that immigration into employment 
tends to decrease the unemployment rate and immigration into unemployment tends to 
increase it (i.e. ∂w/∂g|u < 0 and ∂w/∂k|u > 0).  Matters are more complicated with respect 
to emigration, because f and h also affect Z = (r + f)/(r + h).  Essentially, ∂w/∂f|u > 0 and 
∂w/∂h|u < 0 unless V* is sufficiently large.  Thus emigration from employment tends to 
reduce wages and emigration from unemployment to increase them.  This is because a 
greater probability of emigration for the employed reduces the fear of dismissal for 
shirking (since they are more likely to leave the job anyway), thus tightening the non-  3
shirking condition. Although with a lower h the unemployed have a lower probability of 
emigration, they have a compensating higher probability of domestic employment when f 
is higher, because more vacancies are created. 
 
Another feature of (8) is that, for given migration rates, unemployment can be either 
increasing or decreasing in the attractions of emigration (V*), depending on whether or 
not f > h (because this affects the sign of 1 – Z).  If the employed are more likely to 
emigrate than the unemployed (which in reality is more probable when V* is high), then 
∂w/∂V*|u < 0 and a higher V* implies lower unemployment.  If the unemployed are the 
more likely emigrants, a higher V* implies higher unemployment.  This is because V* has 
conflicting effects on unemployment.  From equation (3), we can see that a higher V* 
relaxes the non-shirking condition, but from (4) we can also see that it tightens it 
indirectly by raising V
U.  The former effect is strengthened by a higher f, and the latter by 
a higher h. 
 
Perhaps the most significant feature of these results is that increasing gross international 
labour flows, but with zero net flows (n = 0), affect unemployment unless all immigrants 
go straight into employment (k = 0) and unless both employed and unemployed have the 
same probability of emigrating (f = h).  An increase in gross flows, keeping net 
immigration constant, tends to increase the unemployment rate, because k increases. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is possible that emigration substitutes for flows into domestic 
unemployment. To the extent that this occurs we might write c = c0 – λf, where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.  
If we consider the special case of f = h, equation (9) then becomes: 
 
  w = e + b + [r + f – g – k + k/u + (c0 – λf)/u](e/p)     (10) 
 
The effects of immigration are as before, but emigration is now likely to reduce 
unemployment rather than increase it.  This happens whenever λ > u, which is not a very 
stringent condition, because u is likely to be a small fraction.  The reason for this is that 
additional emigration does not create as many new job vacancies as in the case where λ = 
0, so it does not shorten prospective unemployment spells so much.  From (3), we can see 
that this relaxes the non-shirking condition. 
 
Because of this, when emigration substitutes for flows into domestic unemployment, it is 
no longer necessarily true that an increase in gross migration, keeping net migration 
constant, tends to increase unemployment.  This is only true in (10) if k > λf.  This 
condition may also be expressed as: 
  
  k/(k + g) > λf/(k + g)          ( 1 1 )  
 
which says that the share of immigrants that enter the pool of unemployed must be 
greater than λ times the ratio of emigration to immigration (since we are assuming that f 
= h).  This condition is more likely to be met when there is net immigration. 
   4
4. Conclusions 
 
In the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), migrant flows affect the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment in a small open economy.  It matters whether 
emigration of employed individuals increases job turnover or merely substitutes for flows 
into domestic unemployment. If the former, then larger gross flows, with a given net 
flow, are associated with higher unemployment except in the special case where all 
immigrants enter employment immediately (in which case only the net flow matters).  If 
the latter, then the effect depends on parameter values, but larger gross flows will always 
increase unemployment if a sufficient proportion of immigrants enter the pool of 
unemployed. 
 
Considering immigration and emigration separately, it is always true that immigration 
into employment tends to reduce unemployment rates and that immigration into 
unemployment tends to increase them, because of the effect on the length of 
unemployment spells, and hence on the incentive to shirk.  Higher emigration rates result 
in lower unemployment in almost all cases; the only exception is when flows into 
domestic unemployment are almost unaffected by emigration (i.e. when emigration raises 
the job turnover rate almost one for one). 
 
Although these results emerge from a particular model of unemployment, they are not 
unique to this model.  For example, the union wage-bargaining model of Layard and 
Nickell (1990) generates similar results through a similar mechanism – migration affects 





Andersen, T.M. (2005) “Product market integration, wage dispersion and 
unemployment” Labour Economics 12, 379-406 
Feenstra, R.C., and G.H. Hanson (2001) “Global Production Sharing and Rising 
Inequality: a Survey of Trade and Wages” NBER working paper 8372 
Lalonde, R.J. and R.H. Topel (1997) “Economic Impact of International Migration and 
the Economic Performance of Migrants” in Handbook of Population Economics by 
M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark, Eds, Elsevier: Amsterdam, Ch. 14 
Layard, R. and S. Nickell (1990) “Is Unemployment Higher if Unions Bargain over 
Employment?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 773-787 
Shapiro, C. and J.E. Stiglitz (1984) “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker-Discipline 
Device” American Economic Review 74, 433-444 